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PROCREATION AND THE POPULATION PROBLEM
MARGERY W. SHAwt
I. INTRODUCTION
Barring the sudden extinction of our species by a global catastro-
phe, the most pressing single problem facing mankind is an uncontrolled
population explosion.' For geneticists there are, in fact, two overlap-
ping population problems: the quantity of life and the quality of life.
If the quality of the gene pool or the environment declines, there will be
increased human suffering even if there are fewer people; life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness will be unrealizable goals. In addition, if
the quantity of people continues to increase, the quality of life will
diminish correspondingly and the goals of our society will be similarly
inaccessible.
II. THE RIGHT To PROCREATE
Our government and society have an interest in limiting the growth
of this country's population in order to maintain a high quality of life.
The interest of the country as a whole, however, must give way to those
individual rights that are afforded to all citizens by the Constitution.
Among these is the fight to conceive and raise one's children, which
has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be "essential,"'
and "far more precious . . . than property rights."'  In Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson4 the Supreme Court found the interest in
procreation to be "fundamental,"' among "the basic civil rights of
man"6 and within the reach of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.7
t Professor of Medical Jurisprudence and Director, Medical Genetics Center,
University of Texas Health Sciences Center at Houston; A.B., 1945, University of Ala-
bama; M.A., 1946, Columbia University; M.D., 1957, University of Michigan; J.D.,
1973, University of Houston. Grateful acknowledgement is due to Ellen Wright, a sec-
ond year student at Yale Law School. Partial support for this study came from
U.S.P.H.S. grant GM-19513.
1. Inadequate food supplies and energy depletion are secondary problems resulting
from overpopulation.
2. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
3. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
4. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
5. Id. at 541.
6. Id.; accord, Grissom v. Dade County, 295 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1974).
7. 316 U.S. at 541. But Justice Marshall, dissenting in a later opinion, disagreed,
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The right to reproduce has, in the past, been considered primarily
within the marital setting.8 For example, the Court stated in Skinner
that "[miarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race,"9 and in Meyer v. Nebraska0 that "the liberty
guaranteed . . by the Fourteenth Amendment ...denotes ...the
right ...to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . .,.1
Within the past decade, however, the Court has made it clear that rights
based on family relationships continue to exist although those relation-
ships have not been legitimized by a marriage ceremony.'"
In addition, any time certain classes of individuals are prohibited or
discouraged from reproducing, the statute or regulation imposing that
limitation is subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause in
order to prevent invidious discrimination. Prohibitions based on racial
classifications are inherently suspect;"8 classifications based on sex have
also been struck down as discriminatory. 14  These equal protection
requirements create an additional hurdle that must be surmounted by
saying, "I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to procreate
. . ." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973). He
argued that the Court had neither stated explicitly nor implied that the interest in pro-
creation enjoys independent, full-blown constitutional protection. Id. Although the
right of procreation may be included in the right of privacy recognized by the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice Marshall insisted that its stature
was limited in Roe when Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), was reaffirmed. 411 U.S.
at 101; see 410 U.S. at 154.
8. Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, - Iowa -, -, 232 N.W.2d 539, 552 (1975).
9. 316 U.S. at 541.
10. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
11. Id. at 399.
12. 'See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Anti-miscegena-
tion laws were designed to prevent marriage and procreation between races. In 1948
a California miscegenation statute was struck down as unconstitutional under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Perez v. Lippold,
32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (en banc). Not until 1967, however, did the Su-
preme Court declare that all statutory bans against mixed marriages were in violation
of the Constitution. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Several school teachers have won suits against their employers for discrimina-
tion because of pregnancy. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974). The Court ruled that overly restrictive maternity leave regulations "penalize
the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child." Id. at 640. Such rules violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 648. See also Buckley v. Coyle
Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973) (teacher not required to forego employ-
ment because of pregnancy). A woman in the Air Force was reinstated after discharge
for pregnancy in Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972). "The regulations
in force at the time plaintiff became pregnant forced a woman to choose between having
a family or having an Air Force career." Id. at 38. An indigent woman with a felony
conviction who had two illegitimate children was relieved of the requirement that she
use contraceptives as a condition of her probation in People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal.
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any legislation seeking to interfere with the fundamental right of pro-
creation.
IXl. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT To PROCREATE
Cultural limits on reproduction have existed throughout man's
history. Primitive peoples devised various methods of maintaining
population size at an optimum, consonant with the available food sup-
ply. These methods included enforced rules of celibacy, prohibitions
against certain kinship matings and limitations of family size by contra-
ception, abortion, infanticide and gerontocide. Legal regulation of
procreation has also been widespread. These include prohibitions
against incest, consanguinity laws forbidding marriage between close
relatives, laws concerning age at marriage, sterilization laws and crimi-
nal statutes involving illegitimacy, rape, fornication and adultery.
Though the right to procreate is presently regarded as basic, essen-
tial, fundamental and, in some situations, constitutionally protected, in
an ordered society no right is absolute. Certain legislative limitations of
individual rights are necessary for the common welfare. As early as
1925 the Supreme Court of Michigan stated: "It is true that the right
to beget children is a natural and constitutional right, but it is equally
true that no citizen has any rights superior to the common welfare."'15 In
Roe v. Wade,' 6 Justice Blackmun wrote:
[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that
one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articu-
lated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recog-
nize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.17
App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967). This decision overturned People v. Blanken-
ship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936) (requiring sterilization of convicted
rapist as a condition of probation is not an abuse of judicial discretion). Most recently,
however, the high Court has held that women employees whose pregnancies are not cov-
ered by group health insurance do not suffer sex discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), rehearing
denied, 97 S. Ct. 825 (1977).
State intervention to prevent procreation of the mentally retarded and other "unfit"
persons by sterilization is under bitter attack and is discussed at text accompanying notes
115-146 infra.
15. Smith v. Wayne, 231 Mich. 409, 415, 204 N.W. 140, 142 (1925).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Id. at 154. He cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), in which
the Court held that
the liberty secured by the Constitution . . .does not import an absolute right
in each person to be . ..wholly freed from restraint. . . . Real liberty for
all could not exist under the. . . principle which recognizes the right of each
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The family has therefore been held to be subject to governmental
regulation in the public interest. Recently the United States Supreme
Court has attempted to define some areas of governmental interest that
would justify an intrusion into family planning. In 1970 the Court
upheld a Maryland regulation that placed an upper limit on the amount
of money one family could receive under Aid to Families With Depen-
dent Children.18 Maryland justified the regulation in terms of "legiti-
mate state interests in encouraging gainful employment,. . . in provid-
ing incentives for family planning, and in allocating available public
funds in such a way as fully to meet the needs of the largest possible
number of families."'19 The Court found that these were valid state
interests and that the classification made by the statute was rationally
related to their promotion. 20 In 1974, Justice Powell stated, "Undoub-
tedly, Congress could . . . constitutionally seek to discourage excessive
population growth by limiting the deductions for dependents." 2' The
Court may be implying in these cases that legislation limiting family size
is more acceptable than an absolute prohibition on procreation for
certain classes of people because it is not as serious an infringement of
personal liberty.
Occasionally, marital partners disagree on their desire for children,
and the conflict is brought to court for adjudication. In Murray v.
VanDevander22 a husband strenuously objected to his wife's hysterecto-
my and sought recovery from the doctor and hospital for damage to his
right to reproduce.23 The Oklahoma court said:
We have found no authority . . . which holds that the husband
has a right to a child-bearing wife as an incident to their marriage.
We are neither prepared to create a right in a husband to have a
fertile wife nor to allow recovery for damage to such a right.24
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his prop-
erty, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.
Id. at 26. Justice Goldberg, discussing the dissenting opinion of Justices Stewart and
Black in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), said that, by their logic, an
invasion of marital privacy requiring parents to be sterilized after having two children
"would not be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be 'silly,' no
provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the
marital right to bear children and raise a family." 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
18. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
19. Id. at 483-84.
20. Id. at 486-87.
21. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., con-
curring).
22. 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
23. Id. at 302.
24. Id. at 304.
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In Ponter v. Ponter2 5 a New Jersey court upheld the right of a married
woman to be sterilized over her spouse's objection. Finally, last year
the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of a woman to have
an abortion without her husband's consent in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth.20  The case law seems to lean toward the existence of a right
of procreation primarily in the wife; the husband's desire to have
children does not come within the constitutional protection if it clashes
with the wife's desire not to have them.
IV. THE RIGHT Nor To PROCREATE
The two previous sections have reviewed the right to procreate and
some of the limitations placed on that right. The right not to procreate
would seem to be a corollary right, but only recently have American
courts recognized the constitutional dimensions of an individual's right
actively to prevent conception or to prevent birth after conception.
Twelve years ago, in Griswold v. Connecticut,27 the Supreme Court
handed down a landmark decision protecting a married couple's right to
use contraceptives. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found a zone
of privacy in the marital relationship that was protected by the Constitu-
tion under the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments.28  Seven years after Griswold, in Eisenstadt v. Baird2 9 the
Supreme Court expanded the holding of Griswold to include the right of
unmarried persons to use contraceptives. Justice Brennan said:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried
persons would be equally impermissible. . . . If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
25. 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
26. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); accord, Doe v. Doe, - Mass. -, 314 N.E.2d 128
(1974).
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Id. at 484, 486. The state statute under attack did not prohibit the use of con-
traceptives to prevent disease but only to prevent conception. Law of March 28, 1879,
ch. 78, 1879 Conn. Pub. Acts 428 (formerly codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53-32 (West 1960)) (repealed 1969) read as follows: "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year
or be both fined and imprisoned" (emphasis added). The purpose of the law may have
been not only to encourage population expansion in the marital setting but also -to pre-
vent illegitimate births by allowing the use of condoms in extramarital relationships
where venereal disease would be more likely to occur. The state, however, argued that
the purpose of the statute was to further their policy against all forms of illicit relation-
ships. 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
29. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
30
Thus, it is settled that the state cannot interfere with the right not to
conceive.
A thornier issue, however, confronted the Cofirt in 1973: Could
a pregnant woman decide after conception not to give birth? In Roe v.
Wade,31 the Court found that the decision to abort during the first
trimester was protected by the zone of privacy surrounding the mother
and her physician and that it could not be disturbed by the state.32 Within
certain limits, then, there is a right not to give birth, even after concep-
tion.
In addition to contraception and abortion, sterilization may be used
as a method of exercising the right not to procreate. Judge (later
Justice) Cardozo described the existence of a right that may extend to
form the basis of the right to be sterilized: "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body. '8 3  There are, however, practical roadblocks to
30. Id. at 453.
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. Id. at 163. But after the first trimester, "[A] State may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health." Id. After fetal viability, "[Tlhe State ...may, if it
chooses, regulate and even proscribe, abortion except ...for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother." Id. at 164-65.
Many controversies arose after the Roe decision. For the next three years there
were numerous attempts by state legislatures to test the guidelines enunciated in Roe.
For an exhaustive legal review of the types of statutory provisions designed to regulate
abortion, see Bryant, State Legislation on Abortion after Roe v. Wade: Selected Con-
stitutional Issues, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 101 (1976). Then last year the Court spoke again.
It held that the requirement for spousal consent and parental consent (in the case of
minors) was unconstitutional, that the saline method of abortion would not be prohib-
ited and that the physician need not take the same care to preserve the life of a fetus
as would be taken in a live birth. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831
(1976). In a companion case, Bellotti v. Baird, 96 S. Ct. 2857 (1976), the Court ad-
dressed only the issue of parental consent for minors.
33. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). This right has not gone unchallenged, however. In an Alabama opinion in
1935 the court scrutinized a compulsory sterilization bill for certain classes of citizens.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935). The proposed bill,
H. 87, § 9, 1935 Ala. Legis., 1st Sess., reprinted in 230 Ala. 544, 547, 162 So. 125,
127 (1935), included the remarkable statement that "ihis act shall not be construed
to authorize the sterilization of any normal healthy person upon his or her own request,
or upon the request of any relative or interested party, for the purpose of preventing
child-bearing or propagation . . . ." Voluntary sterilization has gained rapid acceptance
during recent times. One commentator has pointed out that the total number of ster-
ilized adults in 1974 alone had reached close to seven million, a 42% increase over the
number sterilized in 1973 and a 210% increase over those in 1969. Baron, Voluntary
Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON GENETICS AND THME
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exercising this right. Indigency or unwillingness of a hospital or physi-
cian to provide the necessary services, for example, may successfully
prevent a desired sterilization. The courts, however, have removed
some of these roadblocks. In Ferro v. Lavine, 4 a New York court
noted that the legislature had clearly expressed its intent to provide
family planning services and supplies and that there was "no indication
of any legislative intent to exclude sterilization from the meaning of
'family planning services and supplies.' "3 For these reasons the
court required the provision of state social services funds to pay for the
indigent's sterilization. 6  In another case, a federal district court held
that an indigent woman might have a contract claim against the hospital
when the tubal ligation she requested during another operation was not
performed because of a hospital employee's religious beliefs.3 7 In
Hathaway v. Worcester City HospitaP8 the First Circuit found that in a
decision to terminate the possibility of any future pregnancy "a funda-
mental interest is involved, requiring a compelling rationale to justify
permitting some hospital surgical procedures and banning another in-
volving no greater risk or demand on staff and facilities." 9  The court
held that the hospital's policy prohibiting sterilization operations was
violative of the equal protection clause.40 Thus, in the last dozen years
the courts have recognized the right not to procreate by legalizing
voluntary sterilizations and the use of contraceptives by both married
and unmarried people and by allowing abortions in the early stages of
pregnancy without state interference.
In addition to constitutional protections of the right not to repro-
duce, individuals may have valid claims in tort against those whose
negligence interfered with the effective exercise of that right.4 A series
of tort cases involved the birth of an unwanted child to 'parents who
LAw 267 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1975). The most common operation now per-
formed on adult males is a vasectomy. Good Housekeeping magazine reported that
tubal ligation has become the favored form of contraception among married women be-
tween the ages of 30 and 44 and is second only to oral contraceptives among women of
all ages. The Growing Use of Sterilization for Birth Control, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING,
May 1973, at 196.
34. 46 App. Div. 2d 313, 362 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1974).
35. Id. at 317, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
36. Id. at 315, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94.
37. Padin v. Fordham Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 447, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
38. 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 705.
40. Id. at 706 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 199 (1973)).
41. For a discussion of cases involving the birth of unplanned, defective children
following unsuccessful sterilizations, see text accompanying notes 94-100 infra.
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asserted such claims."2 In Shaheen v. Knight,43 a child-the couple's
fifth-was born after the husband's vasectomy. The Pennsylvania
court refused to recognize a cause of action despite the possibility of
negligence, saying that the granting of damages "for the normal birth
of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of the
people."44  Similarly, in an earlier case the Minnesota Supreme Court
observed that "the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of
another child."45
As long as children were regarded as unequivocal blessings they
were assumed to mitigate any detriment to the parents. In Custodio v.
Bauer,46 however, a California appellate court was willing to consider
the element of damages for a healthy child. 7 The court stressed that
conditions had changed since the days when the birth of a child was
invariably good fortune: "With fears being echoed that Malthus was
indeed right, there is some trend of change in social ethics with respect
to the family establishment. City, state, and federal agencies have
instituted programs for dispensing contraceptive information with a
view toward economic betterment of segments of the population. '48
The Michigan Court of Appeals followed Custodio in Troppi v. Scarf.40
A woman conceived after a pharmacist negligently dispensed tranquiliz-
ers instead of the oral contraceptive pills prescribed for her.5 0 In its
opinion the Troppi court stated a contemporary social policy regarding
birth control:
Contraceptives are used to prevent the birth of heathly chil-
dren. To say that for reasons of public policy contraceptive
42. Most of the cases involve the failure of an operation to sterilize either the
father or the mother. An unusual element in some of these cases is the request for com-
pensation for rearing the normal, but unplanned, child to adulthood.
43. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).
44. id. at 45.
45. Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934). In
Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), another case of vasectomy fail-
ure, the court echoed this sentiment, stating that the jury may have concluded that the
"cost incidental to such birth was far outweighed by the blessing of a cherished child,
albeit unwanted at the time of conception and birth." Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204. Ball
v. Mudge is discussed in Note, Torts-Contraception-Determination of Damages for
the Negligent Dispensing of an Oral Contraceptive Resulting in the Birth of an Un-
wanted Child, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1221, 1222-23 (1972).
46. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303,59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
47. Id. at 321, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
48. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Other decisions recognizing a claim for
negligent sterilization are Bishop v. Bryne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Jack-
son v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
49. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
50. Id. at 243, 187 N.W.2d at 512.
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failure can result in no damage as a matter of law ignores the
fact that tens of millions of persons use contraceptives daily to
avoid the very result which the defendant would have us say is
always a benefit, never a detriment. Those tens of millions of
persons, by their conduct, express the sense of the community.51
The court also allowed the jury to weigh all considerations of having an
additional, though normal, child and to base damages on the balancing
of these considerations.
52
In Coleman v. Garrison53 the couple's first four children were
co-plaintiffs with their parents. 4 The Delaware court held that recovery
of damages for rearing and educating a child conceived after a negli-
gently performed sterilization operation could no longer be denied on
grounds of a public policy favoring childbirth in view of Griswold's
recognition of the constitutional right not to have children.5 Recovery
by the children as co-plaintiffs was not considered by the court in
Coleman, but in Aronoff v. Snider58 three siblings of an infant born
after the father's vasectomy alleged that their love, care and economic
benefits had been reduced from one-third to one-fourth.57 The court
dismissed the complaint as to the siblings but not as to the parents."'
These cases illustrate that the concept of a right not to conceive is
gaining momentum and that physicians who promise an effective steri-
lization may be found liable if conception occurs after the operation.
Since the right of women to seek a legal abortion in early pregnancy has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court,59 doctors may also
be liable if they fail to make a timely diagnosis of pregnancy.
Divergent opinions were handed down in two 1974 cases involving
the physician's failure to diagnose pregnancy in time for a safe abortion.
In Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.60 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
disallowed such a cause of action, stating that the injury was too remote
from the negligence, that the imposition of this liability would place an
unreasonable burden on physicians and that recovery would be too
likely to open the way for fraudulent claims. 61 A New York appellate
51. Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
52. Id. at 262, 187 N.W.2d at 521.
53. 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
54. Id. at 617.
55. Id. at 618 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
56. 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
57. Id. at 419.
58. Id.
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
60. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
61. Id. at 517-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
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court ruled otherwise in Ziemba v. Sternberg. 2  The mother told her
physician that she did not want to have children and followed his
directions for contraception. When she thought she was pregnant he
advised her that she was not. Another physician then found that she
was four and one-half months pregnant and told her it was medically
inadvisable to seek an abortion.6 3 The court denied defendant physi-
cian's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action. It
also said that the woman's failure to undergo an abortion in mid-
pregnancy did not bar her claim.64 The case seems to hold that a
woman's right to discontinue her pregnancy is supplemented by an
affirmative duty on the part of her physician to discover the pregnancy
in time for her to exercise that right. The right not to procreate has
itself given rise to those subsidiary rights necessary to assure its exercise.
V. THE RIGHT To HAVE HEALTHY CHILDREN
One commentator has written, "[]or the individual the paramount
right is not the right to reproduce, often denied in past societies; it is the
right of the child to be born physically and mentally sound."60  Only
recently has it become possible to exercise limited parental control over
the quality of fetuses that are brought to term by selectively aborting
defective offspring. This control has developed because of our rapidly
expanding knowledge of medical genetics.
All chromosomal abnormalities and over sixty-five genetic diseases
can now be diagnosed during pregnancy, 6 giving parents the option to
abort those fetuses found to be affected. In addition to those cases
when there is a certainty of abnormality, there are other situations when
the risk, although undiscoverable, is confined to males (such as hemo-
philia or muscular dystrophy). In these cases the parents can choose to
have only daughters, as the sex of the fetus can be determined at an
early stage.
A high risk of birth defects may sometimes be predicted statistical-
ly through family history or known exposure to certain environmental
agents before or after conception. 67  An example of the latter is the
62. 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
63. Id. at 230-31, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
64. Id. at 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
65. Glass, The Goals of Human Society, 22 BIOSCIENCE 137, 137 (1972).
66. Milunsky, Medico-Legal Issues in Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON GENETICS AND THE LAW 53, 54 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).




rubella (German measles) virus that produces only a skin rash and
fever in the pregnant woman but often devastates the embryo, resulting
in congenital blindness, deafness, mental retardation and heart defects.
Several couples have sued their physicians for failing to inform them of
the high risk of an abnormal baby after the mother contracted rubella
during pregnancy.
Two rubella cases were decided before Roe v. Wade. In the 1967
case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove"" the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to
recognize a cause of action based on a physician's negligence in failing
to inform the parents that they might have a defective child."' One of
the grounds for the court's decision was the countervailing public policy
supporting the preciousness of life. The court said, "The right of life is
inalienable in our society."' 70 It would not acknowledge that sometimes
nonexistence might be preferable to existence; it would not tacitly
sanction abortion. Though the court was ostensibly operating on the
premise that plaintiff could have obtained a legal abortion,'71 its anti-
abortion policy stance was tantamount to regarding all abortion as
illegal.7
2
One year later another rubella case, Stewart v. Long Island College
Hospital," was decided. In this case the woman was referred by her
physician to a hospital to seek an abortion because the physician feared
that her rubella infection would cause defects in the child. She was told
at the hospital that she did not need an abortion and should not seek one
elsewhere. She was not told, however, that two of the four members of
the hospital abortion committee disagreed. 74 The New York trial court
found that the hospital had breached duties it owed to the mother by
failing to make reasonable disclosure of the committee members' differ-
ence of opinion and by giving the mother false assurances that an
68. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
69. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 694.
70. Id..at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
71. Id. at 27, 227 A.2d at 691.
72. The conflict among the members of the New Jersey Supreme Court in their
attitudes toward abortion is reflected most vividly in the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions. Id. at 32, 227 A.2d at 694 (Francis, J., concurring); id. at 49, 227 A.2d at 703
(Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at 55, 227 A.2d at 707 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting); see
Note, Torts-Dignity as a Legally Protectable Interest, 46 N.C.L. REv. 205 (1967);
Note, Torts-Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 10 S. TEX. L.J. 174 (1968); Note, Torts-Malprac-
tice-Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1004 (1968).
73. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 App. Div.
2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 804, 264 N.E.2d 354, 315
N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970).
74. Id. at 438, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
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abortion was not indicated. 75 The appellate court reversed, holding
that the parents' claim must await legislation.
76
In the 1975 case of Jacobs v. Thiemer77 a Texas court awarded
substantial damages to the parents of a child born with congenital
rubella defects. 78 Defendant physician had failed to diagnose rubella in
the pregnant woman and therefore did not advise her of the high risk of
-birth defects. The parents sued, claiming that the woman would have
had an abortion had she been aware of the risk. Their cause of action
was recognized and their request for damages for medical expenses
sustained.79 Although the events in Jacobs occurred before Roe, the
Texas court's attitude toward abortion was probably tempered by Roe.
Like the Gleitman majority, this court assumed that the woman could
somehow obtain a legal abortion, 0 but, unlike the Gleitman court, it did
not neutralize that assumption by regarding abortion as contrary to
social policy. 8'
In these three-rubella cases the courts addressed the duty of care
owed by a physician to reveal to his patient certain risks and hazards of
having a defective child. As public acceptance of abortion evolves and
the medical profession gains better knowledge of how to predict risks,
that duty is increasingly recognized by the courts.
Two cases in which the plaintiffs claimed that a doctor's failure to
warn of the risks of genetic disease constituted malpractice came before
courts in New York last year. The first case, Howard v. Lecher,82
involved a child who died of Tay-Sachs disease at twenty-two months of
age. This disease produces progessive mental and motor retardation
and blindness with eventual fatality in early childhood.8 3 Parents can
be tested to determine if they are "carriers" of the Tay-Sachs gene. If
both parents are carriers, the risk to each child is twenty-five percent that
he will be afflicted."4 When such a risk is discovered, the fetus can be
75. Id. at 438-39, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
76. 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1970).
77. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
78. Id. at 850.
79. Id. at 849-50.
80. Id. at 847.
81. Id. at 848.
82. 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
83. See O'Brien, Tay-Sachs Disease: From Enzyme to Prevention, 32 FED'N PRoc.
191 (1973).
84. Tay-Sachs disease is an autosomal recessive condition which follows a simple
Mendelian inheritance pattern. A mating between two carriers is expected to produce
one-fourth normal offspring, one-half carriers, and one-fourth affected children. Sinceo
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tested for the enzyme deficiency that causes the disease. 5 The parents
sued for emotional distress and for the recovery of medical, hospital,
nursing and funeral expenses, alleging that the physician was negligent
in failing to take a genealogical history, in failing to test the parents and
in failing to determine that the fetus was affected. The parents stated
that had the physician made that determination, they would have elected
to terminate the wife's pregnancy by means of a legal abortion. The
trial court held that such damages are recoverable in New York. The
cause of action for mental distress and emotional disturbances, however,
was disallowed on appeal on the grounds that the physician's negligence
did not directly injure the parents.
8 6
In Park v. Chessin, 7 responsibility for the birth of a child with
polycystic kidneys, another genetic disease that causes death in early
childhood, was in issue. In spite of the fact that the risk of recurrence
of polycystic kidneys after the birth of one child with the disease is
twenty-five percent, two physicians reassured parents whose first child
had died of the disease that there was no reason to fear that a future
pregnancy would result in a defective child. The judge refused to
dismiss a malpractice action brought on behalf of the second infant for
the pain and suffering caused by her disease and the violation of her
claimed right "not to be conceived and therefore not to be born."88 The
judge declared that it is possible to incur a conditional prospective
liability in tort to one not yet in being. Once the child was conceived
and born alive it came within the "orbit of danger" for which defendant
physicians were liable.8 9
These two cases involved substantial genetic risks (twenty-five
percent) to the children of these couples prior to conception. This risk
is a much higher one than that of Down's Syndrome (mongolism),
which occurs most frequently in infants born to mothers over forty years
each pregnancy is an independent event, every fetus has one chance in four of being
affected. See V. McKusicK, HUMAN GNtmrcs 36-37 (1964). Infantile polycystic kid-
neys, see text accompanying note 87 infra, is also an autosomal recessive disease. Both
are fatal in early childhood.
85. O'Brien, Okada, Chen & Fillerup, Tay-Sachs Disease: Detection of Heterozy-
gotes and Homozygotes by Serum Hexosaminidase Assay, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 15
(1970).
86. 53 App. Div. 2d at 423, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 461. The decision as to the cause
of action for medical and funeral expenses was not appealed.
87. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976).
88. Id. at 225-26, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
89. Id. at 230, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
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of age.90 In Park v. Nissen9 a woman in her mid-forties who had given
birth to a child with Down's Syndrome brought suit against her obstetri-
cian for failure to refer her for prenatal diagnosis. The court dismissed
the suit on the grounds that such diagnostic tests were not standard
medical practice.92  One author has suggested that defendant's success
in this 1974 case would probably not be repeated today and that an
obstetrician would likely be held to a legal duty to discuss the risks with
his older patients and offer them prenatal tests.
93
Two cases should be mentioned involving defective children born
after an unsuccessful sterilization procedure. In Doerr v. Villate9 4 a
couple sued the physician for breach of warranty and contract after the
husband's sterilization failed to prevent the birth of an additional child
who was mentally retarded and physically deformed.95 The couple had
already had two retarded children prior to the vasectomy. The Doerr
court did not reach the social policy issues; it reversed the trial court's
finding that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations and remand-
ed the case for substantive consideration.9" Similarly in Hays v. Hall0 7
the parents of two deformed children sued when two more children were
born after the husband's vasectomy. The third child was defective but
the fourth child was normal. The court refused to recognized a claim for
damages for either child.98
Finally, in the Oklahoma case of Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc.,99 plaintiff father sued a pharmaceutical company
90. H. SuTroN, AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN GENETICS 63 (2d ed. 1975). Wom-
en who give birth between the ages of 40 and 44 have greater than a 1% risk of
having a child with Down's Syndrome while those women 45 and over run nearly a
2% chance. Id.
91. No. 190033 (Orange County Cal. Ct. Dec. 13, 1974), cited in A. HOLDER,
LEGAL IssuEs IN PEDIATRIC AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 64 (1977).
92. Id.
93. A. HOLDER, supra note 91, at 64-69. Two well designed studies in Canada and
the United States have compared maternal and fetal morbidity after 2,263 amniocenteses
with matched controls. Results indicate that the procedure is highly accurate and safe,
and does not significantly increase the risk of fetal loss or injury. Prenatal Diagnosis
of Genetic Disease in Canada: Report of a Collaborative Study, 115 Can. Med. Ass'n
J. 739 (1976); The NICHD National Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group, 236 J.
A.M.A. 147 (1976).
94. 74 111. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
95. Id. at 334, 220 N.E.2d at 768.
96. Id. at 338, 220 N.E.2d at 770.
97. 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412
(Tex. 1972).
98. 477 S.W.2d at 406.
99. 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972), rev'd, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
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after the mother, who had been taking oral contraceptive pills, gave
birth to twins with Down's Syndrome. Plaintiff asserted a breach of
warranty, alleging that the pills caused chromosome damage to the
mother's ovum prior to conception. The lower court dismissed the
complaint, 100 but the appellate court reversed and remanded for trial.101
This iecognition of a claim for damage to the germ cells (sperm and
egg) prior to fertilization could become a significant precedent. Pre-
conception injuries are more likely to occur in the future as a result of
increasing exposure to radiation, drugs and industrial chemicals that
cause genetic mutations.
The tort cases discussed in this section illustrate a desire on the part
of parents to have normal, healthy children and a tendency to search for
blame when an abnormal child is born. The courts have been willing,
in many cases, to compensate the parents for their disappointment and
loss when negligence can be found. An unsettled issue is whether the
child himself has the right to be born mentally and physically healthy.
No child has been awarded damages for pain and suffering due to
prenatal defects. In Gleitman and Stewart both infants failed in their
claims for damages.102 In Jacobs v. Thiemer the child did not sue.'0°
The Gleitman court was unwilling even to recognize the injured
infant plaintiff's standing to sue.' 0 4 It based this rejection of standing on
a metaphysical argument presented by Tedeschi, who defines damages
as compensation for the difference between what has occurred because
of the tort and what might have been but for the tort. 0 5 Tedeschi
maintains that when a child claims he should never have been born he
creates a logical and legal absurdity. By his very cause of action "[tihe
plaintiff cuts from under himself the ground upon which he needs to
rely in order to prove his damage.' 0 6 Tedeschi also claims that it is
meaningless to compare a "loss or detriment"' 0 7 in relation to a state of
non-being in which "there is neither happiness nor misery whatso-
ever." 0
8
100. Id. at 963.
101. 483 F.2d at 241.
102. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra.
103. 519 S.W.2d at 847.
104. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
105. Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513, 529
(1966). The court that decided Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d
432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), also considered the theories of this writer.
106. Tedeschi, supra note 105, at 529.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 530.
1977] 1179
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Tedeschi's legal analysis sprang from Zepeda v. Zepeda'0 9 a -suit in
which a bastard sued his father seeking damages to compensate for the
stigma and the social and legal deprivations associated with bastardy. 110
The court admitted that a tort had occurred 1 ' but refused to award
damages on the ground that such a sweeping innovation in remedies
should be created only by the legislature." 2
Zepeda is the only case in which a suit was brought by a child
against his parent for "wrongful life." Bastardy is a handicap, but the
pain and suffering an illegitimate child must endure are emotional pains,
which are not always considered compensable by the courts. A child
with a grave genetic disease, however, may be seriously physically and
mentally handicapped throughout life and, in some cases, destined to an
early death. An interesting question, not yet adjudicated, is whether
such a child would have a claim for relief against his own parents if they
had had genetic counseling, were forewarned of either a high risk or a
certainty that their child would be afflicted, and with that knowledge
brought the child into being.
VI. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PROCREATION
Thus far this article has addressed the right of the individual to
decide for himself or herself whether to reproduce and the extension of
this right to assure an interest in having normal and healthy children.
This section will examine the interests of the state in the quality of its
future citizens.
Consanguinity statutes, which proscribe the marriage of close rela-
tives, have been enacted in all states." 3  In addition to the state's
concern in preserving healthy family relationships, there is a sound
genetic basis for preventing matings between individuals who may have
inherited identical abnormal genes from a common ancestor-their
children are apt to receive such genes in a "double dose," resulting in
autosomal recessive disorders."14
109. 41 11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
110. Id. at 245-46, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
111. Id. at 254, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
112. Id. at 262-63, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
113. The degree of relation necessary before a marriage is prohibited varies from
state to state. Farrow & Iuberg, Genetics and Laws Prohibiting Marriage in the United
States, 209 J. A.M.A. 534, 535-37 (1969).
114. For a discussion of the coefficients of relationship of various consanguineous
matings and the coefficients of inbreeding of resultant offspring, see J. NEEL & W.
SCHULL, Hum.SN HEPDrrY 70-73 (1954).
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Our consanguinity laws have existed since primitive times and have
survived until the present. More recent laws that were written as the
result of a eugenics movement that followed the rediscovery of Men-
del's laws of inheritance in 1900 are more difficult to justify on a
scientific basis.115 Many states have enacted compulsory sterilization
statutes aimed at the feeble-minded, the insane, the habitual criminal,
the rapist and other categories of the "hereditarily unfit."'1 6 The most
horrendous of these statutes was the National Origins Quota Law,117 a
restrictive immigration act passed by Congress in 1924 that was based
on conscious and unconscious racism and prejudice disguised as biologic
fact and genetic theory.118 Attacks on some of these laws have caused
them to be repealed or declared unconstitutional. 9
Carefully drafted statutes providing for the compulsory steri-
lization of the mentally retarded have survived constitutional scrutiny up
to the present time.' 20  In Buck v. Bell,' 21Justice Holmes declared that
"society can prevent those who are manifestfly unfit from continuing
their kind."' 22 The Court has tacitly affirmed this holding as recently
as 1973.23
115. 1. Thompson & M. Thompson, GENETICS IN MEDICINE 2 (2d ed. 1973).
116. Carlson, Eugenics Revisited: The Case for Germinal Choice, in 5 STADLER
GENETICS SYMPOSIA 13, 14 (G. Kimber & G. R&lei eds. 1973).
117. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
118. See K. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1972) for a scholarly,
historical perspective on the impact of eugenic theories on the sterilization and immigra-
tion laws in the United States during the early part of this century.
119. The grounds for declaring some of the statutes unconstitutional include lack
of notice and a hearing, lack of equal protection because limited to those imprisoned
or committed, and cruel and unusual punishment. For case citations, see In re Moore,
289 N.C. 95, 98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1976). See also Annot., 53 AL.R.3d 960
(1973).
120. Compulsory sterilization statutes extant include the following: ALA. CODE
tit. 45, § 243 (1958); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-501, -502 (1971); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 7254 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-569(g) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-931
to -936 (1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to -3910 (1977); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 145.1
to .22 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977-78); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 2461-2468 (1964);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.800(716) (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.13 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36
to -50 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-04.1-01 to -04.1-08 (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43a, §§ 341-346 (West 1951); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 436.010 to .150 (1973); S.C. CODE
§§ 44-47-10 to -47-100 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1, -10-3 to -10-4, -10-10 to
-10-13 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8701-8704 (1968); VA. CODE §§ 32-
424.1, 37.1-171.1 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.92-100
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.12 (West 1957).
121. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
122. Id. at 207.
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
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An ignorance of the laws of heredity is reflected in various court
opinions following the Buck decision in which it is presumed that
congenital feeble-mindedness is hereditary. 2 4 In fact, prenatal environ-
mental insults (such as congenital syphilis, maternal rubella, toxoplas-
mosis, cytomegolic inclusion disease and poor nutrition of the mother
during pregnancy) and birth trauma resulting in an insufficient oxygen
supply to the brain may result in mental retardation at birth with no
hereditary basis.', Furthermore, most of the hereditary forms of se-
vere mental retardation are due to an inborn error of metabolism
resulting in autosomal recessive disease which is rarely passed on to the
offspring.
12 6
An example of faulty reasoning about the hereditary nature of
mental retardation is provided by the Nebraska Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in In re Clayton127 :
Clayton's feeble-minded condition is congenital, and not ac-
quired, and . . . his offspring, if any there should be, would
inherit about the same degree of mentality that is discovered in
him. . . . [S]ince his is an established case of hereditary feeble-
mindedness, his condition would be transmitted in the germ plasm
of his body to his offspring.' 2
8
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Troutman 29 reiterated this heredi-
tary theory, saying that there was no doubt "that heredity plays a
controlling part in the blight of feeble-mindedness."'' s0 The court also
124. See, e.g., State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 229 P. 668 (1931); In re Clayton,
120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931).
125. V. APGAR & J. BEcK, Is MY BABY ALL Riosrr? (1972). When pregnant women
are infected with the toxplasma organism about 20% of the infants are "born with
major defects, including mental retardation, hydrocephalus, epilepsy, eye damage, and
hearing loss." Id. at 444. Cytomegalic inclusion virus may cause "as much, pos-
sibly more, damage to unborn infants" as rubella. Id. at 105. "Studies have shown that
approximately five or six percent of pregnant women become infected with cytomegalo-
virus during pregnancy." Id. at 106. Other suspect maternal infections producing re-
tardation and/or congenital defects in the fetus include Coxsackie B, ECHO and influ-
enza viruses. Id. at 107. Syphilis, which is epidemic in the United States, can also. be
transmitted from a pregnant woman to her fetus with disastrous results. Id. at 415.
Unlike the viral diseases, syphilis can be cured with antibiotics. The risk to the fetus
would depend upon the stage of pregnancy at which the mother was infected and how
long the disease had gone untreated. See also Marx, Cytomegalovirus: A Major Cause
of Birth Defects, 190 SCL 1184 (1975).
126. Only in the rare instance when an affected individual mates with a carrier of
the same recessive disease is there a 50% chance that the progeny will be retarded.
The more likely event of mating with a non-carrier is expected to result in mentally
normal children. See V. APoA & J. BncK, supra note 125, at 315.
127. 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931).
128. Id. at 681-82, 234 N.W. at 631-32.
129. 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668 (1931).
130. Id. at 679, 299 P. at 670.
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invoked public policy in its opinion: "If there be any natural right for
natively mental defectives to beget children, that right must give way to
the police power of the state in protecting the common welfare . ... 'll
These two 1931 cases are of historical interest. More recent cases
demonstrate a reluctance to claim a hereditary basis for mental retarda-
tion, relying instead on other grounds for upholding compulsory steri-
lization statutes. In Cook v. State3 2 it was found that "procreation by
the examinee would produce a child or children ...who would
become neglected or dependent children as a result of the parent's
inability. . . to provide adequate care."133 The court noted that "the
state's concern for the welfare of its citizenry extends to future genera-
tions and . . . the state [therefore] has sufficient interest to order
sterilization.1 1
34
One modern case is of interest because the hereditary nature of the
mental defect was correctly surmised. Down's Syndrome' 85 (also called
mongolism or trisomy-21) results in male sterility, but some of the
affected females are fertile and give birth to children who have a fifty
percent chance of being mongoloid.' 3 6  In In re M.K.R.' 3 7 the mother
petitioned unsuccessfully for sterilization of her mongoloid daughter
because she had been correctly advised that "should she become preg-
nant 'there is a' strong likelihood . . [her] child would also be
abnormal,' and because of her mental retardation she would be unable
to care for her child."'3 "
Two 1976 North Carolina cases have upheld the constitutionality
of the state statutes providing for sterilization of the mentally ill and
mentally retarded. 39 In In re Moore, 40 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina said, "The interest of the unborn child is sufficient to warrant
sterilization of a retarded individual . . . . The people of North
131. Id.
132. 90 Or. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972).
133. Id. at 226, 495 P.2d at 769.
134. Id. at 230, 495 P.2d at 771-72.
135. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
136. A 1971 survey of fourteen offspring born of women with Down's Syndrome
revealed that six were retarded and eight were mentally normal. 2 J. HAmEpTON,
HUMAN CyroGENETiCS 214-15 (1971).
137. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
138. Id. at 469. Since Missouri has no statute allowing the juvenile court to au-
thorize the involuntary sterilization of a child the request was denied for lack of jurisdic-
tion to enter judgment. Id. at 470.
139. Under attack were N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1976), entitled, Steriliza-
tion of Persons Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded.
140. 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
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Carolina also have a right to prevent the procreation of children who
will become a burden on the State."'' In a federal district court
opinion the North Carolina statutes in question were construed to
authorize sterilization when there is clear, strong and convincing evi-
dence that the subject is likely to engage in sexual activity without
contraceptives and that either a defective child or a child that cannot be
cared for by its parent is likely to be born.142 The court further stated
that the state's interest had risen to the dignity of a compelling one .1
4
Dicta in these cases suggest the existence of a compelling state
interest in protecting the welfare of future generations and preventing
the birth of children who are destined to be burdensome to the state.
Congress has thus far resisted the imposition of mandatory controls on
reproduction but has subsidized contraceptives and sterilization opera-
tions for indigents. After a great deal of publicity concerning the sterili-
zation of two minor females in Alabama under a federally funded pro-
gram for family planning services, a federal district court struck down
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare providing for the sterilization of minors and
mental incompetents.'44 The court held that such individuals are in-
capable of the voluntary consent required by statute; 45 the court did not




India is the first country in the world to legalize compulsory
sterilization to control its population growth. 147  It is unlikely that any
of the countries with advanced technological development will attempt
to institute such drastic measures to control population in the foresee-
able future. Education, advertising, social pressures and legislative in-
centives and disincentives are more likely to be the methods used to
convince the public that unrestricted reproduction is undesirable.
141. Id. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312.
142. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 456 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
143. Id. at 457.
144. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
145. Id. at 1202.
146. Id. at 1203. Judge Gesell did not rule out the possibility of federally funded
involuntary sterilization. He stated that "[w]hatever may be the merits of limiting irre-
sponsible reproduction .. . it is for Congress . . . to determine the manner in which
federal funds should be used to support such a program." Id. at 1204.
147. INTERcoM, Sept. 1976, at 5.
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Advances in our knowledge of genetics have made screening pro-
grams for carriers of hereditary disease and prenatal testing programs
highly fashionable.148  These efforts are aimed at improving the quality
of our posterity rather than decreasing its quantity. Both mandatory
and voluntary genetic screening programs have been offered by state
and federal legislatures.' 49 More drastic steps to prevent genetically
defective offspring-mandatory contraception, sterilization or abortion
-have not been suggested as appropriate subjects for legislation. Most
parents are concerned with the health and welfare of their offspring
and will voluntarily take the necessary measures to prevent tragedy.
It may be shown that the frequency of genetic disease decreases as
more educational and service facilities become available; if this is
so there will be no need for the state to intervene. The least restrictive
measures may achieve the goal of healthier children in future genera-
tions and may be the only measures that are required.
148. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INBORN ERRORS OF METABOLISM, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, GENETIC SCREENING (1975).
149. Id. at 287-93. See also Reilly, State Supported Mass Genetic Screening Pro-
grams, in NATIONAL SYMPosrUM ON GENETICS AND THE LAw 159-84 (A. Milunsky & G.
Annas eds. 1975).
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